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The Department of Defense petroleum distribu-r ior. system
utilizes Military Sealift Command controlled clear, product
tankers as its primary element of sealift transport.
Relying upon the commercial tanker fleet for the majority of
its fleet requirements, MS C is presently facing the decline
of that industry due to strong sconomic and political
factors. The reacticn and behavior of both D3D and SSC to
this changing resource scenario has generated considerable
attention and debate. This thesis attempts to depict the
overall structure of the DOD petroleum distribution system,
MSC's product tanker role in that system, and potential
alternative behaviors with regard to the apparent inevitable
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I. IHTRODOCTIDN
"The Department cf Defense is the single largest energy
consumer in the United Stat.es" [Ref. 1 ]• Mthough the
federal government accounts for only about two percent of
the nation's total energy use, DOD is the largest government
consumer representing approximately 81 percent of that
total. The majority of DOD energy is in the form of petro-
leum, oil and lubricants (POL) with annual consumption
equating to 250 million barrels of oil. With over five
percent cf the DOD budget devoted to snergy expenditures, it
is reasonable to expect a fairly intricate and well-planned
strategy dedicated to the management of energy resources
[Ref. 2].
DOD's primary concern is not only to acquire the neces-
sary energy (and in the form required) , but to transport
that energy to the place where it is needed in the timely
and consistent fashicn required in order for DOD to perform
its operational mission. Because of the supply and price
disruptions of the past decade, DOD must also be vitally
concerned with achieving both secure and assured sources of
energy. In spite of the difficulties of the aforementioned
tasks at the outset, DOD nonetheless levies an additional
requirement that all these actions be performed for the
least cost. The latter represents a duality of purpose
(cost efficiency vs. readiness) , which pervades the entire
system of DOD petroleum acquisition and distribution.
Of particular interest in this thesis is the sealift
component of POL logistics, the clean product tanker. Prime
representative of the Merchant Marine in this area of
support, and generally believed to be an important element
of strategic planning, the clean product tanker fleet is

currently in the depths of a serious depression. In addi-
tion, this specialized fleet is facing potentially harmful
legislation which threatens to diminish its size such that
it will be incapable cf providing the support required by
DOD.
The impact of this potentially changing environment for
POL sealift on both the DOD petroleum distribution syst?m in
general, and on the Military Sealift Command in particular,
is a current focus of attention for both logisticians and
strategic planners. It is considered pertinent, therefore,
to sxamine the economic and legislative factors involved in
the future of the clean product tanker fleet, and tc attempt
to reach some conclusions regarding its future viability as
a DOD asset in POL sealift considerations.
To that end, Chapters II and III will discuss the DOD
petroleum distribution system in general, and the role of
the Military Sealift Command within that system specifi-
cally. Chapter IV will examine the supply and demand forces
which impact on the tanker fleet, and will be followed in
Chapter V by a discussion of the specific legislative
factors involved in tanker forecasting. Chapter VI will
attempt to pull this information together in a general
summary of the current clean product tanker fleet status in
order to draw general conclusions for Military Sealift
Command behavior in this potentially changing environment.

II. BACKGROUND
In order to fully appreciate the role of the Military
Sealift Command (MSC) and the clean product tanker in FOL
logistics, it is necessary to understand the generalities of
DOD petroleum consumption and the basic workings and key
players involved in the distribution system. This chapter
is, therefore, devoted to establishing a framework of
general information to assist the reader in placing later
discussions in the proper perspective.
A. DOD PETROLEUM CONSUMPTION
Because of the very nature of tie DOD business, the use
of petroleum represents yet another duality of purpose which
impacts heavily on distribution concerns. DOD faces two
general requirements in this area: 1) to acguire and
distribute sufficient petroleum and petroleum products to
meet peacetime day-to-day operations, and 2) to acquire/
distribute/store POL to meet war and contingency needs.
The former, labeled the Peacetime Operating Stock (P05)
,
represents the annual turnover of D3D petroleum acquisi-
tions. POS requirements are developed by the individual
military services on the basis of geographic location,
resuppiy logistics and anticipated requirements.
War Beserve Materiel Requirements (WRMR) are defined as
the "quantity of POL required to equip and support the mili-
tary forces in hostilities until resuppiy can be estab-
lished" [Ref» 3]. WRMR requirements are also developed by
each military service, with input concerning formula compo-
nents and recommended areas of consideration from the
Department of Energy in the Office of the Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Logistics aid Materiel Management).
These anticipated requirements ultimately become JCS recom-
mendations, and finally Defense Guidance objectives. As the
first major DOD budget document, the Defense Guidance essen-
tially finalizes the service recommendations into required
amounts of petroleum for a strategically determined number
of days of supply to be maintained.
At least a portion of the driving force behind POL
logistics lies in the way in which these two general
requirements are treated. Figure 2-1 illustrates that, if
both requirements were stored in a single tank, the WfiMB
would theoretically float on the 90S volume. The total
amount of fuel in the tank and the amount of POS decreases
as fuel is used, but the amount of WRMS would remain invio-
late. Thus, logisticians must be concerned with two sepa-
rate but related tasks: meeting war reserve required amounts
for storage, as well as constant upkeep of POS so as to
allow the war reserve to remain untouched.
There is considerable concern regarding this aspect of
POL logistics, based upon recent experience during the oil
embargo of the 1970 's. During that time, sufficient POS
requirements could not be met, and DOD found itself dipping
into war reserves in order to maintain its peacetime oper-
ating forces [ Ref. <* ]. The potential impact of such a prac-
tice in the event of hostilities is significantly
detrimental to the carrying out of strategic planning.
Thus, the heavy emphasis placed upon the separateness of the
two POL requirements is being very closely enforced and
monitored at this time. The burien of this policy falls
upon the acquisition and distribution system to maintain POL
levels for both requirements.
Although Figure 2-1 depicts both POS and WRMR in a
single storage unit, this is not necessarily the case.

Considerable funding and planning directed toward acquiring
necessary storage facilities worldwide for WEMR. Although
POS is best stored in close proximity to users, WRMR plan-
ning dictates that storage facilities be located not only
close to users, but in anticipatad areas of need. The
impact upon the distribution systen may be a broadening of
structure to meet diverse geographic supply areas, or (as is
more often tha case) a limiting effect as other geographi-
cally available modes of transport are found. The latter
aspect will be discussed more fully in a later chapter.
The importance of the planning phase of DOD petroleum
consumption lies not only in the intricacies and strategies
of its operation, but in the impact it has on shaping the
structure of the organization to whom it assigns action for
carrying cut these plans. By necessity, DOD must utilize
the considerable military assets at its disposal to carry
out its POL logistics, yet me 11 tham into such an organiza-
tion that accepts dedication to DOD requirements above and
beyond individual service loyalties. The key player in this
DOD network of POL logistics is the Defense Logistics
Agency's Defense Fuel Supply Centar, located at Cameron
Station in Alexandria, Virginia.
B. DEFENSE FOEL SUPPLY CENTER (DFSC)
Until 1973, each military service handled its own POL
distribution and funding activities, with DFSC acting prima-
rily as a fuel procurement activity. In that yaar, however,
DFSC was designated the "Integratad Materiel Manager" for
bulk petroleum products. With that designation came the
responsibility for procurement, ownership, accountability
and distribution of POL used by all components of DOD. DFSC
also buys crude oil stocks for the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve and fuels for specified federal agencies [Bef- 5].
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The Defense Logistics Agency acts as the parent organization
and overseer of DFSC activities, reporting to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense as needed.
DFSC's initial responsibility is che collection of POL
data from the military services, which is then used in :he
composition of the Inventory Management Plan (IMP).
"The IMP is a two-volume publication that Provides data
on storage .availability arid product inventory which is
to be positioned aeograph icailv in support or peacetime
operations and ore-positioned war reserve materiel
requirements" [Ref. 6j.
The IMP is the most important planning document in DFSC
activities, since it entails the amounts of fuel and the
areas in which it will be needed during the upcoming fiscal
year. Published annually with regular quarterly changes, it
is also updated on a constant daily basis to reflect changes
in requirements or military force structure changes. Much
of the information that is collected for this document is
reflected in the Defense Guidance budgeting prcpcsai.
The collection of the data for the IMP is accomplished
tnrough the work of DFSC Defense Fuel Region (DFR) offices
and Joint Petroleum Offices (JPO) , which are established by
the overseas Unified Commands. These two field agents
provide liaison with DOD customers and traffic management
for deliveries within their areas worldwide. In addition,
these offices maintain constant contact with customers
concerning future deliveries and submit monthly "slates" of
updated information to DFSC regarding requirements for the
type of product, quantity and date of the month required.
Based upon the IMP and the monthly slates, DFSC schedules
its acquisitions and distribution of petroleum products.
Beyond the collection and consolidation of POL require-
ments, DFSC is also responsible for ensuring that sufficient
storage exists to maintain required inventories worldwide.
11

To this end, -hay are authorized to contract for additional
facilities through ccmmercial operators when existing mili-
tary service or DLA owned tankage is insufficient. They =r^
also involved in planning for tankage construction utilizing
military construction funding within the continental United
States.
All POL acquisitions are considered owned by DFSC until
delivered tc the ultimate user. Acquisitions ara made
utilizing the Defense Fuel Stock Fund, which is replenished
by DOD user payments for POL received. In the event that
the military user is unable to stors the reguested POL, DFSC
stores the excess within DLA owned tankage until such time
as it can be delivered to the ultimata user [ Ref . 7]. DFSC
is also responsible for advising the military services of
recommended storage programs and additional construction of
storage facilities when applicable.
The final major step in the DFSZ chain of responsibility
is the selection and utilization of POL transportation.
Because of the commercial nature of DFSC operations and the
DOD requirement to run a break-even business with regard to
the Defense Fuel Stock Fund, the salaction of transportation
modas is net limited to militarily available facilities.
DFSC is billed for all transportation costs associated with
tha movement of its POL, including per diem, demurrage,
deadfreight and diversions when appropriate. Transportation
costs are the most easily manipulated for potential savings.
As POL prices continue to rise, DFSC is more and more
concerned with cutting costs in the area of transportation.
DFSC is now utilizing a growing number of alternative
commercial modes for POL movement which represent cost
savings. In the overseas area, where pipelines and refin-
eries are relatively abundant, DFSC has shifted emphasis to
the acquisition of local POL and distribution by pipeline
and tug-barge combinations to meat its overseas needs.
12

There are, however, two specific military organizations
dedicated to the support of DFSC POL transportation.
In accordance with DOD directives, the Military Traffic
Management Command is designated as the DOD single manager
responsible for providing DFSC the requirements for the
movement of balk: petroleum using land transportation within
the continental United States. Land transportation in this
instance includes water movements only within the Great
Lakes, inland waterways, and the inter and intra coastal
waterways.
DOD directives also dafine the Secretary of the Navy as
the "single manager for ocean transportation", with the
Military Sealift Command designated as his agent for
"providing transportation support to DFSC for the movement
of bulk petroleum products utilizing tankers and/or ocean
going barges" [Ref- 8].
Because of the subject area of this paper, the Military
Traffic Management Command and its POL distribution will not
bs further discussed. The Military Sealift Command will be
examined in the succeeding chapter.
In conclusion, although the entire DOD petroleum plan-
ning and management network is highly intricate and widely
dispersed among government and military components, the
actual acguisition and distribution system in general
involves only three levels of coordination: the users
(military and selected government organizations) , DFSC, and
the HTHC-MSC-pipeline transportation system. These levels
and the corresponding flow of information between them (from
an MSC viewpoint) is depicted in Figure 2-2. It is impor-
tant to note that, although the key players in the POL
distribution system are all assignsd or belong to specific
departments of DOD or the military, the actual coordination
tends to reflect a lateral or horizontal system within the
vertical organizations involved. Specialists representing
13

all departments work together on a lateral basis to assurs
FOL levels and distribution requirements are met efficiently
and effectively. A considerable portion of the communica-
tion is handled by direct phone contact between coordinating
parties, with backup paperwork submitted in large part after
the fact (particularly insofar as aotual schedules change).
While all players in the system must report to their
specific departments, there is a strongly emphasized hori-
zontal responsibility for personal contact and coordination
within the distribution, revolving primarily around DFSC.
One might almost contend that these key players mast answer
to two masters: the military and DOD departmental struc-



























































III. DOD PETROLEUM SEALIFT
The sealift component of the 03D petroleum listribution
system is the clean product tanker fleet, which is
controlled and operated by the Military Sealift Command in
Washington D.C. A special branch within MSC, the Tanker
Division, is specifically charged with the day-to-day opera-
tional responsibilities of maintaining and operating the MSC
tanker fleet. This chapter is devoted to a description of
those specific responsibilities, and the part the clean
product tanker plays in MSC POL operations.
A. HISSIOS AND STRUCTURE
As MSC's representat ivs in the listribution network, the
Tanker Division specifically defines its POL mission as
follows:
"...to operate the MSC nucleus canker fleet and other
bulk POL carriers acquired by MSC to meet bulk POL lift
requirements; and to arrar.ce for commercial shipping to
meet DOD and DOD sponsored "bulk oatroleum lift require-
ments with maximum efficiency and' economy" [Raf. 9 j.
The Tanker Division fleet is primarily involved in
point-to-point delivery of refined petroleum products to
military installations, limited (but increasing) numbers of
deliveries to Navy ships at sea, and the transportation of
crude oil in support of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(DOD's crude war reserves).
The division is divided into two branches: the Tanker
Operations Branch and the Tanker Management Support Branch.
The Tanker Operations Branch is responsible for exercising
direct operational ccntrol over all tankers assigned to or
17

chartered by USC [Ref. 10]. In addition, this branch is the
primary contact with DFSC, and conducts direct and daily
liaison with that office concerning all changes is either
operations or lift requirements. The Tanker Operations
Branch prepares aonthly estimates of tanker fleet capa-
bility, and accordingly initiates requests for additional
charters or release actions to reduce capability where
required. It is also responsible for preparing and initi-
ating all administrative paperwork for tanker operations
including schedules, routing instructions and sailing
orders. Because of the close liaison required with D?SC r
all tanker operations are controlled from this branch in
Washington D. C. Representative assistance is provided,
however, by on-location US C offices as well as D?R and J?0
personnel overseas. The Tanker Operations Branch is also
particularly concerned with Quality Assurance Inspections,
which are conducted en = ach tanker prior to POL loading.
Failure to achieve a required rating for the type of fuel to
be ioadsd results in costly delays and schedule adjustments.
Therefore, all prospective charter tankers are inspected
prior to final agreement, and rsquire approval of this
branch before contract signature. This is particularly
important because product tankers are, theoretically,
capable of switching from crude to refined product loads,
and many do so on the basis of shifting demand.
The Tanker Management Support Branch is primarily
responsible for:
"developing, coordinating and integrating long and
short-range operational plans, policies and procedures
for the worldwide movement of petroleum products* moni-
toring and ensuring the accurate preparation of opera-
tional data upon which the monthly MSC POL billings are
based; and developing and preparing the division over-
head budget submission for the operating and planning
budgets" [Ref. 11 ].
18

B. HSC FLEET SIZING PROCEDURES
The actual tanker fleet maintained by msc and the Tanker
Division is based upon requirements and predictions dictated
by DFSC. Initial planning requirements provide the earliest
indication of the number of tankers needed, and are
submitted to MSC by DFSC approximately 15 to 18 nonths prior
to the fiscal year. These are the same requirements used in
the previously mentioned Inventory Management Plan, which is
used in the presidential budget subnission. A second set of
data, the operating requirements, is submitted by DFSC about
6 months prior to the fiscal year, and represent a more
accurate presentation of the types and amounts of fuel to be
moved. This set of data is used by MSC to develop an appro-
priations budget for fiscal year operations.
Utilizing these two sets of data from DFSC (which in
total reflect a detailed listing of requirements including
the number of barrels to be shipped, the area of origin,
destination port, product type and the month in which the
movement is to occur), MSC conducts a detailed step-by-step
procedure to convert these requirements into Handy Size
Tanker (HST) equivalents. The rational behind this proce-
dure is based upon the fact that this particular size tanker
represents the most efficient and capable transport of the
generally small amounts of DOD petroleum and petroleum prod-
ucts to be shipped. A perfect HST is defined by MSC as a
25,293 DWT clean product tanker with a speed of 16 kts.
Utilizing these limits, the MSC tanker fleet is then
converted into HST equivalents, and the resulting HST
requirements and HST fleet is compared (after certain manual
adjustments for "real world conditions") to ascertain the




Based or. this determination of the number of HST tanker
equivalents necessary to fulfill ?DL requirements for the
fiscal year, the Tanker Division taen determines the number
of charter tankers needed to meet the task.
ISC has four primary sources from which to obtain addi-
tional charter tankers: the Merchant Marine fleet (U. s.
flag) , the National Defense Reserve Fleet, the Ready Reserve
Fleet, and the foreign flag fleet (which includes both the
Effective tJ. S. Controlled vessels and foreign owned
vessels)
. The NDRF and RRF vessels are principally main-
tained for emergency purposes, although they are available
for use by MSC if required. The tankers in these fleets
are, however, generally vary old and would require extensive
preparations to make them sufficiently seaworthy. The
Effective U. 5. Controlled tankers ire those operating under
flags of convenience (Liberia, Panama, Honduras) which are
owned by 0. S. interests. These tankers are available for
requisitioning in an emergency situation only and, since
they are crewed by sailors from around the world, represent
some concern to MSC as to the actuil willingness and avail-
ability they offer. Foreign flag tankers are available to
MSC only by voluntary contractual agreements or nation-to-
nation agreements. Therefore, in peacetime or limited
contingency situations, the only tinkers that are realisti-
cally available for MSC charter are those within the U. S.
Merchant Marine.
There are four types of charter agreements utilized by
MSC in expanding the nucleus fleet. Bareboat charters
involve a long term charter during which the tanker is
manned and operated by MSC government personnel. Nine new
tankers within the nucleus fleet were obtained through
"build and charter" agreements, which were based upon bare-
boat type charter practices. A second type of charter is
the time charter, which may involve a time period from a few
20

weeks to several years, but requires that the ship owner
provide crew and ship management for the term of the
charter. Under this agreement, the ship owner pays ail
costs except fuel, pert charges and canal tolls. As in
bareboat charters, tiie charterer's pay a hire fee which may
be based en either DWT per month or dollars per day. The
third type of charter is the voyage charter, which may be
expressed in either consecutive or single voyage format.
The single voyage charter (or "spot charter") is the one
most often used by MSC to meet emergency lift requirements.
This agreement provides for one shipment only, and remunera-
tion is based upon the amount of freight carried (i.e., set
amoant per ten of cargo) . The last type of charter agree-
ment is the Contract of Affreightment, which specifies an
amount of cargo to be carried in an agreed upon trade and
time period, but dees not require the owner tc commit
specific ships. The owner is required only to meet the
requirements spelled out in the contract regarding tank
coatings and size of tanker, and is paid based upon a rate
per ton of cargo.
MSC utilizes the Navy Industrial ?und for operational
expenses. This revolving fund is generally available to
provide working capital for industrial or commercial type
activities of the Navy which provide goods or services to
agencies of DOD [Ref. 13]. This find is not dependent upon
congressional approval since MSC charges customers in a
manner comparable to private business which is intended to
constantly replenish the fund. The objective for MSC tanker
operations, based upon both the type of funding and the DOD
emphasis on cost effectiveness, is to break even rather than
return a profit. In actuality, MSC appears rarely to
achieve this goal. In fiscal year 1982, MSC operations
produced a total loss of $38.5 million. Petroleum opera-
tions were the only commercial cost category to show an
21

actual cost decrease in that year (down $43.7 million),
primarily based upon a reduced necessity in that time frame
for spot chartered tankers [Ref. U].
MSC billing rates are designed to apply uniformly to all
shippers, with petroleum rates based upon the size of MSC
controlled tankers and the number of loading and discharge
stops on a particular voyage (Ref. 15]. The NIF is consid-
ered a particularly effective mechanism for "controlling the
cost of services prcvided and for providing a method of
financing, budgeting and accounting for operations"
[Ref. 16]. It is especially useful for MSC because it
permits immediate financing for peak periods as well as
controlled retrenchment during slaci periods.
C. THE CURRENT MSC CLEAN PRODUCT T&NKER FLEET
MSC's Tanker Division presently operates a fleet of 23
ships representing 793,000 DMT. (See Figure 3-1) Figure
3-2 illustrates the reduction in the XSC tanker fleet over
the past decade, particularly with regard to their HSI
equivalent capability. Three factors appear to have direct
influence on fleet sizing methodology which reflects this
reduction. The first of these factors is a reduction in
lift requirements. Based partly on the steady decrease in
petroleum imports (to be discussed in a later chapter), this
factor also reflects DFSC policy to extend its use of pipe-
line networks to deliver petroleum products. Recently DFSC
advised MSC that it intends to utilize pipelines to deliver
approximately 1U million barrels of POL to U. S. east coast
locations that have been traditionally served by MSC
tankers. MSC anticipates that this change alone will reduce
their fleet of product tankers by four in the very near
future. MSC also faces the loss of an additional tanker to
pipeline and tug-barge
operations on the west coast.
22

involving approximately 5. 5 milli3n barrels of petroleum
products [ Hef. 17],
A second factor impacting on N3C fleet sizing involves
the increasing number of restricts! missions of HSC tankers,
which limit the number of tankers available for scheduling
and thereby reduce flexibility within the flee-. These
missions are defined as priority missions from which tankers
cannot be diverted to meet other requirements, and include
long range scheduling for carrier group support and special
ics capable -cankers involved in Alaskan support operations.
A third factor is the increase in tanker size. In order
to achieve economies of scale and to take advantage of lower
crude prices, tankers built within the past few years have
tended to be larger than the HST type tankers utilized by
MSC. This equates to fewer tankers carrying a fixed amount
of cargo in terms of MSC, and again reduces both flexibility
and fleet size.
The MSC Tanker Division generally configures its fleet
to handle about 85 percent of the anticipated annual
requirements forecasted by DFSC, and relies largely upon
spot charters to meet additional emergency lift requirements
during the fiscal year. If requirements during the year are
less than expected, MSC has the option of placing controlled
tankers in the fleet into a ready r=serve status for limited
periods of time in order to match requirements and capa-
bility, and thus achieve desired cost efficiency levels.
D. TBS BILIT&RILX OSEFOL CLEAN PRODUCT TANKER
Because of the relatively delicate characteristics of
DOD petroleuu products, as well as the tendency toward
building larger product carriers, the Military Sealift
Command has made an effort to distinguish between those
tankers considered useful to DOD requirements and those
23

believed to be unable to meet military specifications. In
the commercial tanker business, any tanker which meets the
minimum technical requirements to carry aither clean or
dirty products may be called a "product carrier". In many
instances, this equates to a cruie carrier that has the
capability of carrying one or two grades of dirty fuel on
occasion. For DOD, however, ths primary emphasis is on
considerably more sophisticated tankers which meet, the
requirements for carrying aviation quality fuel. On that
basis, MSc defines the militarily useful clean product
tanker as a "vessel that is appropriately coiled, coated and
compartmentalized to enable it to carry several crades of
petroleum products without contaminating or mixing with
other cargoes" [ Bef . 18 ]. In addition, because the majority
of clean fuel storage and refining facilities utilized by
DOD are geared to smaller tankers, lightering and cff-shcre
pipeline discharge facilities for clean product are very
limited. Thus, MSC adds to the description the size limita-
tion of between 10,0 00 and 50,000 DWT, which allows use in
the limited draft areas of DOD POL load and discharge.
These two basic requirements, multi-product capable (which
is characteristic of the small ciean product tanker) and
between 10,000 and 50,000 DWT, define MSC's vision of the
militarily useful clean product tanker.
Although the current state of the clean product tanker
industry represents an excess of capability and therefore
ensures to some extent the availability to MSC of spot
charter and long-term charter vessels through the
mid-1930's, MSC is already attempting to identify other
types of transport within the shipping trades which can be
utilized in the event the product tanker market continues to
decline. There are three alternatives which MSC has consid-




Tug-barge combinations in the 20,000 to 50,000 DWT range
appear to offer the best option in terms of draft and
multi-cargo capability. Much of the tug- barge fleet repre-
sents relatively new construction (1970 and later) and
offers advantages of recent technology and considerably
lower overhead in terms of manning costs. A typical tug
requires a crew of approximately ten, as compared with the
average crew of twenty-five aboard a product tanker. The
main disadvantage to the military is in the relative slow
speed (average best speed about 10 kts) and limited range
before requiring refueling. The latter has played a large
part in confining the tug-barge to the coastal trade.
Although transoceanic tug-barge combinations do exist, they
do not presently represent a sufficiently large resource to
adequately fill the product tanker role in DOD. In addi-
tion, based :: the slow speed, ttSC believes the tug- barge
could not offer a one-to-one replacement of product tankers
of equal size (general rule of thumb: 4 barges = 3 tankers)
[R9f. 19].
There are currently only about 20 chemical carriers
under 0. S. flag which could meet the specifications for
carrying DOD petroleum products. although they offer advan-
tages similar to the product tanker, there is a general
feeling that such tankers would be primarily involved in,
and essential t c, the industrial effort, particularly in
terms of a contingency or war situation. Thus the chemical
carriers are not considered an available substitute for
product tankers at this time [ Ref . 20].
The largest category of available alternatives to the
clean product tanker is the crude carrier in the 50,000 to
250,000 DWT range. These tankers offer a considerable
capacity advantage in terms of crude oil lift. Since,
however, most DOD POL shipments tend to be relatively small




, these tankers would represent excess
capacity in DOD lift requirements. in addition, out of
approximately 76 such tankers available at this tine, only
49 are listed as having the coated tanks required. None of
these 76 ars carrying clean product at this tins [3ef. 21].
Even for those tankers with ccated tanks, serious concern is
evidenced by MSC regarding the ability of ownsrs to suffi-
ciently clean the tanks (after many years of carrying crude)
for successful adaptation to clean products.
E. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the MSC Tanker Division relies
almost exclusively upon two entities for its business: the
Defense Fuel Supply Center, which represents its only
customer; ani the U. 5. Merchant Marine, which is its
primary source of clean product tankers. Any changes in the
business of these two entities* is reflected in the Tanker
Divi-sion business of POL lift. That DFSC is especially
concerned with achieving cost savings in the transportation
of petroleum is evidenced by its increasing use of pipelines
and tug-barge combinations. While MSC must also be
concerned with the cost efficiency of its operations, it
faces the equally important and frequently conflicting
requirement for fleet readiness to meet contingency and war
situations. The latter requirement is particularly affectei
by the status of the U. S. Merchant Marine, which is gener-
ally recognized as the source from which support for war
operations will be sought. In the case of MSC, a declining
clean product tanker industry equates to a declining emer-
gency response capability. An axamination of the current
state of this industry, and the forces acting on it, is
therefore pertinent to an understanding of tha potentially
changing environment which both strategic planners and MSC
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IV. STATE OF THE TANKER INDUSTRY
The tar.kar industry in general has suffered froa
increasingly depressed business trends in the pas* several
years, resulting in a worldwide state of excess capacity
heretofore unegualed in the history of the industry. In
spite of certain advantages created by legislation and
government subsidies (specifically the Jones Act and
Construction and Operation Differential Subsidies), the
United states tanker industry is also experiencing declining
business which is a direct reflection of world tanker market
trends. In aa effort to understand the current state of the
industry, this chapter will focus on a discussion of the
general supply and demand factors wnich impact on the tanker
market, and on an overall picture af the industry as it now
exists.
A. SUPPLY AND DE3AND IN THE TANKER INDUSTRY
Although the following discussion is sufficiently
general in nature to have application tc the tanker industry
in general, an attempt is made to specifically relate the
factors in supply and demand to the product tanker industry
in particular.
1 • Demand in the Product Tanker Marke t
The demand for tankers is essentially a derived
demand based upon the worldwide demand for oil. Put simply,
as the demand for oil rises, so does the demand for ways in
which to transport oil from origin to market, so long as
there is sufficient demand. This his traditionally meant an
increase in demand for tankers, *hich have served as the
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primary mods of ocean transport for oil resources. while
competition from other modes of oil transport have diluted,
tc some extent, this primary factor in tanker demand, it
remains nonetheless as the single most important overall
factor in the tanker market.
The worldwide demand for oil may then be divided
into three general subfactors which directly impact or. the
size and composition of the tanker fleet demanded. These
subfactors include the geographic, economic and political
considerations of the world and U. S. petroleum markets. It
is the petroleum market which, necessarily, provides the
primary impetus for product tankers specifically designed to
carry refined products, and which are the focus cf this
thesis.
Geographically, the initial consideration lies in
the location of crude oil resources in relation to the
refined product market. Theoretically, as long as ocean-
separate crude oil suppliers from petroleum markets, tankers
will be in deuand. In terms of product tankers, however,
this theory has lost significant impact in recent years.
Refineries located close to the crude oil source once repre-
sented the major origin for product tanker voyages, thereby
involving frequently long and costly routes and transporta-
tion costs. The past decade has seen an increase in the
building of refineries in established and emerging economies
close to the market source. These localized refineries
allow petroleum markets to take advantage of economies of
scale by transporting larger quantities of crude to the
market area, thereby reducing traasportation costs as well
as enabling the use of other traasportation modes (i.e.,
pipelines). Indeed, the localization of refineries effec-
tively encourages the construction and use of pipeline




An additional aspect of the geographic factor of
tanker demand concerns the depth of water at refinery port
facilities. In past decades, refineries at crude oil
resource points worldwide were limited in draft capability,
which made the relatively shallow draft product tankers
espaciaily suited for the pickuo of refined oroducts.
"Economically, a large ship in clean trade would lose
money. It's service would be limited to Dorts large
enough to^accomodate it. It would spend excessive time
in port, loading and discharging, because the throughput
of most refineries and storage areas is still geared to
the small clean product tanker" [Bef. 22].
In spite of the draft restrictions which seem to enhance the
use of clean product tankers, "the demand for seaborne
delivery of clean product has been steadily dropping for
twenty years" [Bef. 23]. This is again primarily the result
of an increase in both localized refineries and pipeline
distribution. Although only a relative few of the deep
water ports and off-shore platforms allow large amounts of
crude to be off-loaded to refineries, more and more devel-
oping and major industrialized nations are depending on a
system of pipelines to distribute crude to, and clean
product from, local refineries.
The economic factor in tanker demand is essentially
a function of the relationship between crude and product
consumption and the growth in a nation's GN? and real
income. "Economic decline and recession will result in a
decline in oil demand and precipitate a decline in tanker
demand" [Bef. 24], In addition to recessionary impacts, the
push toward oil conservation and reduction of dependence
upon foreign oil sources (particularly in the U. S. ) must
also be considered in current decreased consumption rates.
Figure 4-1 indicates the decrease in United States petroleum
imports during the past decade. Although an increasing
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dependence upon, and availability of, Alaskan North Slope
oil must be considered a part of this decline, it is none-
theless an indication of current tanker surplus (which
reflects an established fleet carrying less and less
imported oil).
Overall, the general outlook for future oil consump-
tion (and therefore tanker demand) tends tc be bleak.
Economic forecasts for worldwide eoonomic growth range fron
3 percent to 4 percent through the end of the century
[Hef. 25], Richard K. 3 rr (senior maritime adviser for
Exxon Corporation) in a September 1982 speech to the
Ship-Trans-Port symposium in Rotterdam, forecasted the















icient use of e
expected to s
and, growth in








































































Any discussion of the economic factors in tanker
demand must also include some reference to oil prices and
oil availability. As oil prices continue to increase,
competition to reduce overhead oosts in the petroleum
industry also increase. As has been mentioned previously,
transportation costs are particularly vulnerable to efforts
to cut costs. Technology and conservation inspired innova-
tion have resulted in numerous cost savings, including pipe-
line utilization and new tug and barge combinations.
Efforts to enhance the use of alternative fuels are ongoing
in the worldwide struggle to acquire cheap energy.
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Oil availability, currently considered tc be in
"glut" proportions, has the capacity to simultaneously
reduce the need for extensive storage (both land-based and
afloat) and to speed up fleet voyages. As concern shifts
from oil availability and the need to "store oil upon the
water", to a concern for the cost of capital, tankers are
likely to operate faster on laden voyages than in times of
limited availability [Hef. 27].
Finally, within the political arena, tanker demand
is affected by both legislation and governmental dictums
related to intracountry oil transportation. Import quotas
and export prohibitions impact upon tanker fleet size and
utilization. A ourrsnt sxainple involves the Alaskan North
Slope source in the United States, which prohibits experts
and therefore increases the demand for U. S, flag tankers
fcr oil transport. Legislation regarding home country flag
shipping can act as both deterrent and protector in tanker
demand. Within the United States, the Jones Act protects
the 0. S. 'flag tanker fleet by restricting carriage between
U. S. points to U. S. owned and operated ships. Most coun-
tries have similar home fleet protection laws, which
prohibit to some extent foreign tanker demand within their
ports.
In conclusion, the demand for tankers is generally
predicated en how much oil needs to be moved and how far it
has to be moved. Geographic, economic, and political
factors further impact on tanker demand by specifying the
type of tanker required and the size of the fleet needed to
fulfill the market demand. Currently, these factors are
impacting detrimentally on the product tanker fleet in
particular, by increasing transportation cost consciousness
and therefore making alternative modes especially attrac-
tive, and through a general reduction in oil consumption.
Particular 0. S. legislation which is viewed as potentially
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threatening to the 0. s. flag product tankar industry will
be discussed in the next chapter.
2. SuddIv in the Tanker Industry
Tanker supply is a function of both the current
available petroleum hauling business and future predictions
for consumption. The oil b com of the 1960 's, and the subse-
quent speculation that oil consumption would continue to
increase at the same rate, encouraged the building of an
abundance of tankers. in spite of the energy consciousness
of the 1970's, worldwide oil consumption continued to
increase through 1979. Figure 4-2 illustrates this general
increasing trend, particularly among the centralized econo-
mies, where both oil production and consumption are
expanding even into the present decade. Developing coun-
tries have also increased oil consumption from 14 percent in
1973 to 19 percent in 1982. Most forecasts indicate that
this trend will continue but will have limited impact on
product tanker usage due to extensive pipeline utilization
and the heme location of crude oil resources and refineries.
Within the free world, the expansion of the oil economy
appears to have ceased. Free world oil consumption dropped
12 percent from 1973 to 1982 as a percentage of total world
consumption. This is perceived as a period of "consolida-
tion and retrenchment" for free world oil consumption, which
is likely to last through the 1980's and, potentially, well
into the next decade [Ref. 28]. As oil consumption figures
continue to decrease, q^c^sb refineries in the free world
continue to be closed and pipelina facilities expanded to
meet the new demand for cheap transportation of oil.
The large number of tankers built in the 1960's
based upon the optimistic outlook for future oil consumption
reflected a trend toward construction which continued
through much of the next decade. Even in 1979, when extreme
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oil price increases and related petroleum deficiencies:
changed the world's view toward the once easy resource,
business for the product tanker fleet was extremely good.
Indeed, there were scarcely enough tankers to meet the
demand for the suddenly precious petroleum. Tankers were
required to make numerous stops at refineries during a
single voyage in order to fill their tanks, and the surge
toward petroleum storage was at its height as nations strug-
gled to acquire sufficient refined products to meet demand.
Industrial nations (primarily Japan) utilized product
tankers as well as crude tankers to maintain "huge floating
stockpiles" of crude and refined products [Ref. 29].
This peak utilization of tankers did n:: f however,
continue as predicted. As crude oil became more available
and OPEC members endeavored to increase purchases by a chas-
tened market by offering all manner of discount packages,
the incentive to store large amounts of oil decreased. The
emphasis changed to reducing transportation costs and
utilizing localized facilities. The transport cf large
amounts of crude oil once again became viable and reflected
the benefits of economies of scale in oil acquisition.
Increased output by ncn-OPEC countries (i.e., Maska North
Slope, Mexico, Eritain, Norway, and Denmark) also impacted
on available business for tankers by reducing sailing
distances and reducing emphasis on the Middle East
[Hef. 30].
The tanker industry in the 1980's has found itself
in a state of excess capacity beoause of the burgeoning
business of the 1960's and 1970's, the optimistic forecasts
during those decades for future oil consumption, and the
resulting trend by tanker owners to build more and more
tankers in order to take advantage of the market. In spite
of the rather drastic change in those expectations in the
early 1980* s, many tanker owners (until fairly recently)
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continued to retain surplus tankers in the belief that the
market would still turn around in their favor. As th*
fallacy of that outlook became clear, tanker owners began to
seek ways in which to reduce capacity and lower overhead
costs. An examination of the tanker industry today lust
therefore include not only these tankers still in operation,
but those tankers which have been "laid up" and those which
have been scrapped. The fact that such a division of tanker
resources must be made is ample indication that the industry
is indeed suffering one of its worst business periods in
memory.
B. THE W0RLDHID2 AND 0. S. TANKER INDUSTRY TODAY
The current state of the worldwide tanker industry is,
in a word, depressed. The 27 January 1983 issue of Fairplay
explained the situation as follows:
"So deep is the current oil charter market depression
and so few are the prospects of any improvement in the
foreseeable future that shipowners may be forgiven for
Questioning the viability of staying in the business.
Shipowners efforts to halt and reverse the widening of
the qap between tanker supply and demand resulted in a
doubling cf tonnage sold for scrap and a record volume
of tonnaae committed to lay-tip. A simultaneous
shrinkage"of world oil demand, however, meant that all
tnese extreme and commendable aeasures improved the
trading scene not one jot" [ Ref . 31].
Figure 4-3 illustrates the changing supply and demand
for tankers worldwide during 193 1 and 1982, and the
resulting increase in tanker surplus. tfhile the entire DWT
figures for the oil carrier market have changed relatively
little, the growth in inactive tankers and still operating
surplus tankers is extreme. The continuing use of surplus
tankers is an indication of tanker owner attempts to retain
excess capacity in spite of decreasing demand. Part of this
may be based upon some retained optimism, but a considerable
portion is also based upon:
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"...a fast declining level in ths scrap value of ship-ping, a glut in the scrap steel industry in the Far
-ast, and a marked lack of incentive for any demoliti:>7.yards.to improve their facilities or to incrpase their
capacity" [Ref. 32 ].
The operating tanker surplus comprises slow-steaming,
deadfreight, increased port time, excessive periods of off-
hire and temporary lay-up. Slow-steaming, considered the
largest component of tanker surplus, accounted for an esti-
mated 73 million DWT (or 57 percent) of the total operating
surplus of 1991 of 127 million DWT [Hef. 33]. Although at
least part of the reason tanker owners resort to slow-
steaming is based on the soaring price of bunkers ever the
last several years, it also represents an attempt to keep
vessels cut of lay-up. Deadfreigat, or part-cargcing, is
especially prevalent among medium-sized tankers, "where the
structure of freight rates provides the incentive to accept
part-cargoes and to enter into trades to restricted draft
ports normally served by smaller tankers" [Ref. 34].
The inactive tankers represented in Figure 4-3 include
those tankers which have been idle in port for two months or
more, are laid-up, damaged, under repair or engaged in off-
shore storage schemes [Ref. 35]. As can be noted, inac-
tivity increased sharply during the two years depicted.
Figure 4-4 illustrates total wordwide inactive tonnage
through the third guarter of 1933, as well as reported sales
to breakers (or scrappings) in the tanker fleet. As scrap-
ping continues at these extreme rates, in spite of the steel
industry recession and reduced world demand for scrap, the
tanker fleet is "pruned" of some of its excess capacity.
This is shown by the evident stabilization of inactive
tonnage rates in Figure 4-4. Nonetheless, tanker surplus
worldwide is still estimated to excead 150 million DWT of
total oil carrier supply at this tiae [Ref. 36].
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The United States flag tanker fleet consisted cf 201
vessels of 5000 DWT or more in both clean and crude trade as
of 1 October 1983. . Figure 4-5 illustrates the erosion cf
clean product tankers since 1978, which has resulted in an
almost ccmplete reversal of the ratio of clean to dirty (or
crude) tankers during that period. Aside from the aforemen-
tioned economic factors, a considerable factor in this
reversal involves the rush by small product tankers tc the
crude trade provided by the Alaskan North Slope. The effect
is nonetheless severe, particularly in terms of the Military
Sealift Command and the DO D petroleum distribution system,
figure 4-6 further delineates the breakdown of the current
inventory cf tankers into the clean and dirty trades, and
indicates that only 60 clean tankers within the privately
owned fleet are available for utilization. As of 1 October
1983, 35 vessels capable of carrying refined products had
switched to the crude trade, as illustrated in Figure 4-7.
An additional 32 tankers within the product tanker fleet are
currently laid up indefinitely. The latter represents a
reduction in lay-up of two vessels which were scrapped
between 1 May and 1 October of this year.
Based upon market forces alone, the trend appears to be
strongly in the direction of decreased demand and a
continuad decrease in the number 3f U. S. flag tankers
available. The Military Sealift Command, in an attempt to
forecast future availability and construct its fleet suit-
ably, has estimated that market forces alone will further
decimate the product tanker fleet by 20 vessels by 1986.
(See Figure 4-8) This potential reduction in excess
capacity and tanker surplus (primarily through scrapping)
may enhance the 0. S. flag tanker business through sheer
survival of the fittest, but will simultaneously undermine
the capability of MSC to meet DOD pstroleum hauling reguire-




Market forces, however, are not the only factors
expected to impact on the future product tanker fleet within
this country. Current legislation is also threatening to
further diminish this struggling industry. These legisla-
tive factors and anticipated impacts represent a vital
concern to both tanker owners and military planners, and
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V. U. S. LEGISLATION: CURRENT AND PROPOSED
The United States government his evidenced considerable
concern for the Merchant Marine fleet by adopting, directly
or indirectly, subsidizing legislation in its behalf. This
legislation has included the Jones Act, Construction and
Operating Differential Subsidies, Title XI Federal Shi?
Mortgage Guarantees, Tax Deferred Ship Construction Funds,
and Construction Reserve Funds. Whether these acts have
been successful in nurturing a Merchant Marine relied upon
by both commercial and military sources is a matter cf some
conjecture. It is safe to assume, however, that because of
high construction and manning costs associated with shipping
in this country, unsubsidized U. S. flag vessels would have
extreme difficulty competing with the world fleet.
Within the U. S. flag tanker fleet, the Jones Act in
particular has provided some relief to surplus conditions
experienced in recent years. The opening of the Alaskan
North Slope in 1977 with its associated restriotions on oil
export offered some refuge to the growing list cf idle
tankers. At least a portion of the tanker surplus
(including product tankers) was absorbed by this expanding
Alaskan trade, based upon the Jones Act reservation of
coastal shipping to U. S, flag vesssls.
Current and proposed legislation, however, now threaten
to offset the relief heretofore provided. Within the
product tanker market in particular, there are three legis-
lative issues which are viewed as tiaving potentially detri-
mental impacts upon fleet survival. These issues include
the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, the Alaskan North
Slope export proposal, and the DOT CDS repayment issue.
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A. PORT AND PAHKER SAFETY ACT OF 1978
The 1978 Protocol, sponsored by the Inter-Sovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization at the 1974 safety of
Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), became affective on 18 May
1981. This Protocol introduced stringent raw safety meas-
ures and pollution prevention factors for international
shipping. The United States adoptad these measures into the
Pert and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 for all ships calling at
U. S. ports.
The most significant portion of the act in relation to
tankers is the requirement for inert gas systems (TGS) and
segregated ballast systems on existing product and crude
tankers. Segregated ballast systems appear to be primarily
pollution oriented, reserving certain tanks for ballast in
order to deter out-pumping of contaminated gaseous mixtures
from other tanks to make way for ballast. Inert gas
systems, en the other hand, are safety motivated, requiring
non-inflammatory inert gases rather than inflammatory oxygen
combinations in tanker systems. The IGS deadline for
existing product tankers in the 20,300 to 70,000 DWT range
was 1 June 1983, although there is some evidence of a
softening of attitude regarding those tankers operating
between U. S. ports. All new product tankers contracted
after 1 June 1979, or delivered after 1 June 1982, are
require! to have inert gas systems in use when delivered in
order to carry any cargo. Segregated or dedicated clean
ballast tanks are required on ail clean product tankers in
the 20,000 to 40,000 DWT range by 1 January 1986 (or when
they reach 15 years of age, whichever comes first) . Clean
product tankers between 40,000 and 70,000 DWT were required




This law adds milliDns to new construction costs of
tankers, and is estimated to cost approximately $8 million
for retrofitting on existing tankecs [Ref. 38]. In addi-
tion, segregated ballast on existing vessels causes a
"reduction in earning capacity because the vessel loses
one-third of the cargc carrying capacity" [Ref. 39].
Figure 5-1 illustrates the IGS situation for U. S. flag
tankers on 1 .lay 19 83, one month before the installation
deadline. Well over half the fleet in the 20,000 to 50,000
DWT range were not eguipped with IGS, and only 13 ships
reflected definite plans to install IGS to meet the new
requirements. within the product tanker fleet in partic-
ular, reluctance to invest in IGS installation is a reflec-
tion of the prohibitive cost, poor tanker market and the
relative age o •e x ne :leet. Figure 5-2 illustrates thi the
U. S. flag product tanker fleet is represented in large part
by ships constructed more than twenty years ago.
"Many owners of older vessels, with little chance of
securing worthwhile trading, are unable to justify the
large expenditure associated with retrofitting and this
was undoubtedly one of the reasons contributing to the
higher level of scrapping during the year" [Ref. 40].
Segregated ballast tanks required in the 20,000 to
40,000 DWT range by 1 January 1986 are expected to further
decrease the number of available 0. S. flag product tankers
currently in existence. New product tankers, with IGS and
segregated ballast tanks included in original construction,
are relatively few in number. These new construction addi-
tions are also expected to increase the size of new vessels
to offset the loss of carrying capability and enhance econo-
mies of scale. Those new product tankers in construction
tend to be in the 5 0,000 DWT range and beyond, precluding
them from effective MSC utilization [Ref. 41 ]. Present
tanker owners unwilling to invest in retrofitting face the
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alternatives of scrapping vessels or moving into the foreign
trade market. The latter does not necessarily represent a
long-term option „ however, as mora and mora nations ratify
the 1978 Protocol into local law. The Port and Tanker
Safety Act of 1978 in the United States, for instance, also
applies to foreign flag tankers entsring U. S. ports.
B. THE ALASKAN NORTH SLOPS EXPORT ISSUE
A second legislative issue, currently before the 0. S.
Congress, involves the potential approval of oil exports
from the Alaskan North Slope reserve. Alaskan oil exports
represent an extremely controversial issue which has been
debated throughout the past decade. The Carter administra-
tion tried and failed twice in efforts to = asa export
restrictions in this area. At the cime of this writing, the
current renewed debate has not besn decided, although the
majority of opinion indicates that there is little chance of
success in overturning current expert restrictions.
Regardless of the outcome of the present debate, the Alaskan
oil export argument is likely to continue for many years to
come. For that reason, it is pertinent to discuss the
implications of this issue with regard to the 0". S. flag
product tanker fleet.
Alaskan crude oil export restrictions are incorporated
in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPS) of
1973 and in the Export Administration Act (EAA) . Although
neither act bans exports outright, Congressional approval is
required before exports can begin.
"Foreign sales of Alaskan oil are now permitted only if
several criteria are met to ensurs that exports would be
in the best interest of the United States. Thus, by
definition. any attempts to gut the existina safeguards
are themselves proof that the perpetrators do not have
America's 'best interest' in mind" [Ref. 42].
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The above quote from the Joint Maritime Congress serves to
illustrate some of the vehemence involved in the struggle
over Alaskan oil.
The principle lobbyist in favor of exports appears to be
the State of Alaska. A report issued this year by the
Alaska Statehood Commission argued that:
"...the export ban keeps the oil from its "natural
markets", namely Japan and the Orient. The law as it
now
#
stands forces the oil to be moved in expensive
American tankers and depresses the price of the oil. If
the law is changed, Alaska's oil revenue ccul be
increased by $500 tc $800 million per year. (In addi-
tion) the export ban forces the sale of oil to the wrong
markets such as the mainland West, Gulf and Atlantic
coasts dictates long and expensive trips by U. S. flaa
carriers of some 13,000 miles /ia the Parana Canal"
[Ref. «3].
The report further states that exporting Alaskan oil could
help balance the trade deficit with Japan, reduce transpor-
tation costs (based on a resulting "triangle" trade with
Mexican and Mideast oil to anticipated shortfalls on the
Gulf and East coasts), and would increase U. 5. windfall
profits tax receipts [Ref. 44]. Their position in this
issue has been strengthened somewhat by the appointment of
Senator Murkowski (Rep., Alaska) as the new chairman of the
Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, and by the Reagan administration's emphasis on
international trade and anticipated energy security benefits
to the Far East.
Opponents include "the domestic maritime industry,
owners of the Panama pipeline, various consumer advocate
groups, and the major Alaskan Nortti Slope (ANS) producers"
[Ref. 45 ]• Primary emphasis by the opposition has focused
on the potential effects on the tanker industry, increased
reliance on foreign oil, and anticipated costs to the
government. The American Institute of Merchant Shipping
estimated (in a letter to President Reagan in March of 198.3)
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that approval of ANS exports would result in perhaps a 25
percent to 30 percent loss of active a. S. flag tankers, and
more than 6,000 shipboard and shoreside jobs. The letter
further states that additional revenues to the State of
Alaska and windfall tax profits to the federal government
will
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Although actual numbers differ from estimate to estimate, it
appears generally accepted that the federal government would
indeed lose money through defaulted loans by failing tanker
businesses. Consumer groups contend that, although ANS
exports will have little price impact on Gulf and East coast
refineries, "those en the West coast will undoubtedly pay
more for their crude" [Hef. 47], This view is based upon
the expectation that West coast refineries would be required
to increase prices (so as to balance export commitments) in
order to retain access to ANS supplies.
The three major ANS producers (Exxon, Arco and Sohio)
appear equally unexcited about a short-term ANS expert
program, primarily because their own fleets are heavily
involved in ANS shipments within the United States. Such a
program would have the same devastating impact on these
fleets as on the government owned fleet, and would represent
serious short-term losses in investment unlikely to be
offset by increased income [Ref. 48].
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Of particular interest in this issue is ths anticipated
redistribution of U. S. ail movement caused by ANS experts.
Currently almost 20 percent of subsidized tankers, and over
half the unsubsidized fleet, is involved in ANS crude trans-
port. However, neither the Jcnes Act nor subsidization will
enable U. S. flag tankers to compete effectively with
foreign flag tonnage if export restrictions are removed.
"If exports were permitted, the west coast surplus would
be absorbed in the Pacific Rim market, instead of being
shipced to the East coast. Japan, with its policy or
establishing a wide supply network, would be a major
outlet, as would Sinqapore. On tae East coast, crude
oil imtcrts would be substituted for ANS supplies. The
most likely. long term source is thought tc be the
Arabian Guir, not South America or Mexico. (This) would
have the uncommon effect of lengthening average voyage
distances while reducing shipping costs as cheaper,
foreign flag tonnage entered the trades" [Ref. 49].
The Military Sealift Command's appraisal of the impact
of an ANS export policy is rsflected in Figure 5-3. MSC
believes that export under foreign flag of ANS crude may
result in currently ANS employed large crude carriers in the
U. S. flag fleet becoming excess capacity. Some of these
large tankers may go to scrap, while others could replace
the smaller U. S. flag tankers. In either case, MSC would
anticipate the loss of approximately 20 tankers currently
employed in ANS shipments. The range, however, runs as high
as over 120 ships depending upon the amount of ANS oil
allowed for export. Product tanksrs currently employed in
ANS transport are likely to be the first to go based upon
economies of scale and reduced transportation costs offered
by foreign competition.
In spite of an expectation by the Department of
Transportation that a removal of the ban on ANS exports
would also include a provision guaranteeing carriage by U.
S. flag ships, such an export policy remains a serious
threat to the Merchant Marine fleet in general and the
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product tanker fleet in particular [ Hef . 50]. whether the
proposal achieves passage by Congress or is again defeated,
the ANS export issue is likely tc remain a battleground for
several decades. While its defeat may not save the product
tanker fleet from continued reductions, its success would
certainly ensure a more rapid demise. Opposition by iarc-
hant shippers is likely to remain strong for the duration
however. In the words of W. M . Benkert, President of the
American Institute of Merchant Shipping:
"We can ascertain no substantial benefit to ths national
interests of the United States from the expert of
Alaskan oil and ... see considerable negative and
destructive imoact. As a consequence, we are and must
be strongly opposed to this proDosal and hooe the the
Administration an d Congress will not make such a
mistaken policy change which may well benefit foreign
interests but can only be nothing short of a monumental
blunder with respect to all aspacts of United States
national interests" [Ref- 51].
C. CONSTRUCTION DIFFERENTIAL SUBSIDY PAYBACK
The third government issue with potential impact upon
the U. S. flag tanker fleet involves a proposal by the
Department of Transportation to allow "tankers of any size
constructed with CDS funds and prasently operating in the
foreign trade to enter and operate in the Jones Act trade
upon total repayment (with interest) of the unamortized CDS
amount owing" [Ref. 52]. This issue is presently before the
C. S. District Court foe the District of Columbia, based
upon charges by the Independent U. S. Tanker Owners
Committee that DOT overstapped its authority in issuing such




The Construction Differential Subsidy is a program
established by the Merchant Marine Act of 19 35 in an effort
to place the construction costs of ships built in -the United
States on a parity with foreign construction costs. CDS
itself is generally defined as the difference in cost
between U. S. shipyard construction and foreign shipyard
construction. Either competitive bidding or negotiated
contract prices may be utilized to arrive at CDS rates
within established statutory ceilings.
In 1977, when the 225,000 DWT subsidy-built Stuyvesant
cculdn't find employment in foreign trades, her owners
applied to the Maritime Administration to repay CDS and
rejoin the domestic trade (where ANS oil was beginning to
offer new employment for tankers). Subsequent interim rules
established by the Maritime Administration permitted
refunding only where "financial hardship was involved and
then only for tankships in excess of 100,000 Dwr" [Ref. 53],
In September of 1982, the D. S. Court of Appeals revoked
these interim rules and directed that new, permanent rules
be implemented. In January of 1983, the Department of
Transportation issued its proposal to allow tankers of any
size to repay CDS and re-enter the lomestic trade, with the
previous financial need requirement deleted.
It should be noted that the CDS repayment issue and the
ANS export issue are intricately connected. Utilization of
the CDS program prohibits a tanker from U. S. domestic
trade. However, the primary rationale for re-entry into
that trade at the present time rests upon the ANS domestic
market. Should the ANS export policy be approved, CDS
tankers would have little reason to desire re-entry into the
domestic trade.
Since the Stuyvesant case which ultimately resulted in a
directive requiring precise policy definitions of proposed
CDS repayment issues, the Maritime Administration has
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adopted a "meantime" policy of granting temporary waivers of
domestic trade restrictions for large tankers built under
the CDS program. The Maritime Administration has granted
over 25 of these waivers for very large class carriers
(VLCC) since 1978, the majority of which have bee:: for
periods of six months. In 1932 alone, these waivers added
approximately 900,000 D WT of capacity to the Alaskan oil
trade [Ref. 54],
The rationale behind DOT'S proposed unlimited CDS repay-
ment appears to rest en a belief that the U. 5. flag fleet
would be improved through a survival-of-the~f ittest environ-
ment. Charles Swinburne, DOT Dsputy Assistant for Policy
and Program Davelopment, indicated in testimony before the
House Merchant Marine Subcommittee in March of this year
that the proposal would create a "bumping process ...
(whereby) the least efficient ships wculd pull out of the
domestic trades" [Ref. 55]. He described these least effi-
cient ships as the "smaller and older" tankers that would
probably be out of the trade soon anyway, based on the
current tanker market.
DOT estimates that there are currently 15 subsidized
VLCC tankers with a total capacity of about 2.5 million DWT
that would be eligible for CDS repayment and entry into the
ANS trade. If all 15 took advantage of the proposal, the 0".
S. Treasury would receive an estimated $475 million
(including $275 million in interest) in repayment [Ref. 56].
In reply to questions regarding tha potentially devastating
effect on current vessels in the trade, Mr. Swinburne
countered:
"... the very stiff financial cost for a CDS tanker to
re-enter, a substantial capital investment akin to that
of a new domestic vessel. Our analysis did not conclude
(that) if all fifteen VLCC's enter the trade it is clear
that some existing companies will be harmed, but there
are relative degrees of harm ... devasted is an extreme
degree of harm" [Ref. 57],
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The Reagaa administration thus far has been supportive
of the DOT proposal in its continuing effort to curtail
subsidy programs in general. No money has been budgeted for
the CDS program in the past two years (as of April 1983),
which reflects a substantial change from the $536.4 million
per year subsidy program in effect when President Reagan
took office [aef. 58].
While DOT continues to insist that "the national economy
will benefit because overall oil transportation costs wouli
be brought down by the greater efficiency of the relatively
new subsidized tankers", opponents of the proposal continue
to protest what they view as yet another instance of govern-'
ment interference [3ef. 59]. The opposition's stand in this
matter may be best illustrated by additional comments made
at the House Merchant Marine Subcommittee hearing held in
March of 1983.
Ran Hettena, appearing on behalf of the American
Institute of Merchant Shipping, stated:
"We never dreamed that the ground rules that firmly
separated the two trades, and reg,uired ships built witn
suosidy to operate exclusively in foreign trade, would
be subverted. Anyone could assess coastwise supply and
demand in its own terms, and back his -judgement with his
own mcney, without fear that the oonditions of the world
market would be abruptly imported. Suddenly, however,
the whole subsidized fleet is to be allowed to abandon
its statutory and contractual commitments, and to flood
into domestic trade, which will be destroyed. Is it not
profoundly unjust that the qovernment should talk of
recoverina its investment in 'subsidy, which it appears
to think was a mistake, when that recovery can only take
place at cur expense" [Raf. 60],
Michael Klebanoff, President of the American Maritime
Association (and of Cgden Marine), said:
"The new proposal ... takes up the position that artifi-
cially forced competition, the creation of the govern-
ment against the basic policy of the statute, is
desirable in itself because it will eliminate "ineffi-
cient" ships in the domestic fleet — meaning, it seems,
smaller tonnage, the very tonnage, by the way, that the
Navy tells us is essential tor its wartime operations.
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The permanent introduction of 2.6 million DWT of thelargest subsidized tonnage will drive all independent
tonnage from the Pacific basin; according to our calcu-
lation, tha Atlantic side of th9 Alaskan trade. which
has already been much reduced bv tha Panama pipeline and
other commercial conditions, 'will require under one
million tons of non-propr ietary shippina: against which,
if only ten subsidized ships in tae 90,000 DWT range
should enterr^ there will then be over three million tons
of modern shipcing competing for tha business. That is
a formula for * economic disaster" [ Rsf . 61].
Finally, Maritime Institute for Research and Industrial
Development President Julian Singman stated:
"In cur opinion, no proposed rule or regulation that we
have seen in many years has been capable of making more
mischief for the American merchant: marine. The loss of
tonnage t the loss of jobs and tne loss of defense
pr ecarecnese could be enormous" [Bef. 62].
The Military Sealift Command's analysis of CDS repayment
impact upon the product tanker fleet predicts an immediate
loss of 20 tankers in the 5 0,000 DWT and less range if such
a proposal is enacted. Their focecast for 1936 includes
only 7u product tankers in the militarily useful arena, and
perhaps only 125 vessels in the entire 0. S. flag tanker
fleet (including crude carriers) . Their predictions for the
product tanker fleet by the year 1986, based upon an
approved CDS repayment policy, are illustrated in Figure 5-u
by employment within the market [Raf. 63].
The three issues discussed in this chapter appear to
reflect a change in attitude by government agencies toward
tha U. S. Merchant Marine. Regulation which has histori-
cally been protective in nature has given way to a trend
toward deregulation, and a seeming reliance upon competition
and market forces to upgrade and maintain an efficient
fleet. Although the results of this changing attitude are
based, at present, cnly on prediction, there appears to be
sufficient grounds to expect that approval and enforcement
of such policies would indeed changa to some extant the
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appearance of the U. S. flag tanker flset. How the DOD
petroleum distribution system, and the Military Sealif 4-
Command, will or should react to this changing resource
environment is an issue causing serious debate and consider-






























































































































































71. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SOHHARY
The preceding chapters have attempted to draw a picture
of the system which controls acquisition and distribution of
POL within the Department of Defense. It is an unquestion-
ably important system in national defense ongoing activities
and future planning, yet one which receives limited acknowl-
edgement or publicity. in a reflection of their civilian
counterparts, the majority of defense personnel appear to
take fuel energy for granted. The system, however, requires
precise coordination and knowledgeable manipulation.
Without experts in every branch and organizational structure
within DOD working closely together to coordinate require-
ments and distribution, the system would cease to function
effectively.
This system is also, out of necessity, extensively
commercial in nature. DOD owns no refineries, and insuffi-
cient tankers to conduct its FOL business. It must rely,
therefore, en commercial refineries and fleets to supply its
needs. This strong reliance requires the system to conduct
itself in a commercial manner in order to compete on an
equal basis with other customers. Out of a requirement to
maintain cost efficient operations, profit (or at least
break-even) oriented goals and funding processes are
utilized in a reflection of commercial enterprise.
Revolving funds enable both DFSC and MSC to conduct the
flexible and ever changing business of POL effectively.
Only individual service fuel requirements are actually a
part of the DOD budget, with DFSC/MSC acquisition and
distribution expenditures refunded by service customers.
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Within this commercial context, DFSC acts as DOD's
"Exxon" (under exclusive contract) for POL procurement and
routing,- with data obtained from DFR/JPO agents regarding
requirements. The MSC Tanker Division "shipping company" is
one element of the transportation resources available to
DFSC for POL movement. Essentially a tramp operation by
definition, HSC tankers have no home port. Instead they
travel continuously worldwide to perform pickup and delivery
activities based on the dictates of DFSC scheduling.
Because of the nature of DOD POL requirements fcr prima-
rily small loads of sensitive aviation type fuels, the clean
product tanker has been the major focus of MSC utilization.
This specialized product tanker has provided the necessary
safe compartmen taiization of a viriaty of POL products,
relative speed and flexibility of operations deemed neces-
sary by DOD.
Ten years ago the product tanker industry was a
burgeoning business, expanding rapiily to meet surplus
demand. Today it is in a state of collapse, with growing
excass capacity and increasing scrip and lay-up activities.
While DOD's saphasis en cost effectiveness has not changed,
it has (along with the rest of the world) underlined that
emphasis by actively seeking cheaper modes of POL transport,
often seemingly without regard to readiness. The resulting
increase in localized refinery/pipeline/tug and barge usage
has played a major part in the decline of the product tanker
industry.
Legislation within the United States promises to play an
ever larger role in that decline, as the government
evidences a changing attitude toward the Merchant Marine in
general. Protective policies of past decades appear to be
giving way to a reliance upon market forces and a disincli-
nation for financial involvement in U. S. shipping.
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Figure 6-1 illustrates the decline in militarily useful
product tankers over the last threa decades. A decline in
reed is not an unusual phenomenon subsequent to contingency
and war situations, and the growing size of tankers is
reflected in the much slower decline in dead weigh- tonnage.
There has been, nonetheless, a very sharp drop in the past
decade. Forecasts indicate that tais decline is likely to
be particularly steep for the remainder of the 1980's at
least. Militarily useful product tankers are obviously a
dying breed in a rapidly decaying industry.
The initial question raised by this gloomy outlook must
be -- "so what? 51 . How genuinely important is the militarily
useful product tanker in the futurs DOD petroleum distribu-
tion system in both peacetime and contingency situations?
What can this tanker do that no othsr mode can? What makes
the decline of the clean product tanker fleet a matter of
concern for DOD?
Obviously an extensive study could be built around these
questions. Although there is research being done concerning
FOL transportation in general, very limited research exists
concerning the actual valua of the product tanker in partic-
ular to DOD. It is generally recognized, however, that the
product tanker offers speed, flexibility and cargo charac-
teristics (i.e., size and military ?0L compatibility) that
are particularly adaptable to wartime and contingency
scenarios. It has not necessarily been established that
they are the only acde of transport offering such advan-
tages. Nor is it certain that the present situation dees
not reflect a natural market pruning of an outdated and high
cost commodity, with potential replacement by better alter-
natives. What is certain is that the product tanker is one
of the mest expensive distribution elements for DOD, and is
thus highly susceptible to cost effectiveness policies.
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If one accepts that the product tanker is vital to DOD
operational planning, then it is necessary to exolore -he
types of action and behavior that can be utilized in an
effort to retain it as a viable resource.
B. CONCLUSIONS
There appear to be three general action alternatives for
consideration regarding the potential demise of the product
tanker fleet:
1. Take action to support and maintain
product tanker availability;
2. Adapt to the changing environment;
3. Or do nothing
„
These alternative actions will be discussed primarily from
an MSC viewpoint, sines they are presently the most vitally
concerned and involved in this area of conjecture.
In discussing the first alternativs, it is particularly
helpful to include a number of actions which MSC has identi-
fied as having value toward a policy of retention of the
product tanker resource. Included are strong D3D opposition
to both CDS repayment and ANS exports, as well as several
indirect subsidization schemes. The latter involve the
suggestion that other employment be created for small clean
product tankers, such as increased afloat storage and
refueling at sea responsibilities, or that the MSC fleet be
openly ever-sized to meet contingency requirements rather
than peacetime needs. In addition, they suggest that
current commercial surplus tankers destined for scrap be
purchased (at considerably lower prices) for expansion of
the Ready Reserve and National Defense Reserve fleets.
Finally, they suggest that direct subsidy, when compared
with the costs of reduced capability, may be the least
expensive alternative in the long run.
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Aside from opposition to CDS repayment and ANS experts,
each of these actions designed to retain the product tanker
fleet represent a considerable cost to DOD and the govern-
ment. Excess capacity, as the commercial industry has
discovered, is excessively expensive. Funding for both the
RRF and NDRF is a budget item which receives annual pains-
taking Congressional attention, and additional funding for
acquisition and maintenance is unlikely to receive favorable
response. The afloat storage vs. in-ground storage issue is
one which requires further study and planning before taking
any action. There is some question, moreover, as to whether
the tug and barge combination might not be the all around
better method for such storage. 3ased upon current govern-
mental attitudes and policies, it appears unlikely that
direct subsidy of the product tanker fleet is a viable
alternative. Only the refueling at sea activity, in which
MSC requirements have more than doubled over the pas- six
years, appears to offer potential for increased product
tanker employment. Yet as DF3C continues to utilize other
modes and reduce 8SC fleet size, this aspect is unlikely to
provide sufficient employment for optimal contingency fleet
sizing [ Ref - 64 ].
The second alternative action, adapting to the changing
environment, requires a change in some of the basic assump-
tions which underlie current operational planning. MSC
suggests that present planning assuaes that the majority of
POL required for wartime and contingency efforts will origi-
nate from the United States (specifically from the Gulf
coast) , thereby requiring extensive product tanker capa-
bility [Ref. 65]- DFSC, however, contracts for and stores
POL worldwide. If the assumption were modified to reflect a
dependence upon oil sources within projected scenario loca-
tions, as well as distribution systems, from NATO allies,
potentially less product tanker capability would be
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required. The latter suggestion has been raised by James
Milas, Deputy Director of the Tanker Division at HSC
Headquarters. Other suggestions include a relaxing of the
requirement to use U. S. flag vessels which would have an
impact on MSC fleet requirements. Mr. Milas suggests that
the dependence which could be placed on a foreign ship owner
to transport POL into a contingency or wartime area may be
to some extent a function of the dollar price DOD is willing
to pay for such service [Ref. 66].
Within the context of changing assumptions is a require-
ment for detailed assessment of available resources,
including a planned conversion or adaptation scheme and a
determination of possible hold actions by DOD on certain
resources. If large crude tankers are likely to be the
primary available asset, then a scheme by which they can be
quickly converted for POL lift must be devised. If MSC
adapts to the new environment by sizing its fleet strictly
to meet DFSC needs, then contingency planning must include
the number of ships likely to be required to expand this
fleet. Determination of the relationship between civilian
requirements and military requirements in contingency situ-
ations is necessary to identify the extent of resources
available for military hold and utilization. In addition,
planning must include an identification of available foreign
storage facilities and a determination of whether increased
prepositioned storage is a viable alternative to trans-
oceanic shipment.
Finally, an increased dependence on commercially avail-
able fuels versus the current dependence on fuels refined to
meet military specifications, could potentially increase the
available resources for POL lift. The product tanker's
primary advantage is, after all, the ability to strictly
compartmentalize and protect sensitive military fuels.
Fuels less susceptible to short tank life and contamination
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could effectively increase the number of ships available to
carry it, as well as decreasing current necessary adaptation
requirements. In addition, the use of commercially avail-
able fuels would also increase the base of acquisitions both
locally and worldwide. There is, of course, a perfomir.ee
cost in such an alternative. It is a cost which ultimately
must: be measured against the cost of too little lift capa-
bility and too few POL sources.
The last alternative involves allowing the market to
essentially take care of the problem through supply/demand/
competition factors. Taking no action would result, theo-
retically, in: 1) allowing DFSC and the world market to
continue to increase dependence en pipeline and tug barge
modes of transport; 2) allowing a continued decrease in :*SZ
fleet sizing based on decreasing DFSC requirements; 3)
taking no action to curtail a diminishing commercial product
tanker fleet; and 4) depending upon market forces to supply
a substitute for product tanker capability.
The opportunity to choose an alternative action implies
that the 'situation has been closely studied, accepted, and
that planning activities are well under *ay. Adaptation is
obviously the preferred route in this instance, yet we are
rapidly approaching the point where the only alternative
will be to react to this changing resource environment.
With the exception of the Military Sealift Command Tanker
Division, there appears to be limited involvement or concern
regarding the potential loss of the product tanker fleet as
an element of sealift capability. At the present time, only
one pertinent study appears to be anderway. The original
"DOD Sealift Study" attempted to define and quantify all
types of lift capability required for contingency and
wartime purposes [Ref. 67]. Because of major disagreements
concerning the study's projections for future capability
with regard to the product tanker by the MSC Tanker
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Division, a separate study is now being conducted as an
adjunct to the original with its primary focus on the
product ranker resource [Ref. 68,69]. It is to be hoped
that such a study will provide a basa of information from
which DOD planners can define a policy of action regarding
DOD's role in future POL sealift.
In the final analysis, there are only two real issues
which must be considered and resolved: 1) how much and what
kind cf carrying capability is required for the DOD petro-
leum distribution system to continue to operate affectively;
and 2) what trade-offs between readiness and cost efficiency
is DOD willing to make.
The product tanker has been a readily available an 1
highly capable asset for the distribution system. It is
this author's opinion that it will continue to be an element
of that system, albeit a reduced one, for many years to
come. It is simply too agile, too flexible, and too reflec-
tive of the qualities of quick response needed by the mili-
tary to let disappear. It is unlikely, however, that it can
continue to carry the burden for ?DL sealift respcnsiblity
in contingency and wartime scenarios.
"To assume that you can move hugs amounts of petroleum
long distances (via the Droduct tanker) ... is just not
valid anymore. The military has to adapt its planninq
... when the commercial system changes, we nave to
change. If we don't change and we can't adapt, then we
will have to sosnd bundles' cf dollars to create our own
distribution system. .\nd no one is going to be willing
to do that" [Ref. 70].
Readiness does not depend upon the product tanker, but
on the ability of DOD to get POL where it's needed and when
it's needed. Therefore, it is vitally important to identify
where available and assured sources of POL are, and thus
determine route distances required for movement and ulti-




Simultaneously it must be accepted that readiness is an
elusive quality which will always axcesa. cost efficiency
limits. Ultimately cur degree of rsadinsss will depend or.
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